

Well, good morning. I'm Colonel Rickey Smith from the Army's Future Center within Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). I have also been a member of Task Force Modularity since it was created 18 months ago. Today I want to discuss with you an overview of the Army's Modular Force. If you step back and think about it, this is one of the most significant changes the Army has undergone since, say the 60's, with the Reorganization of the Army Division (ROAD) actions or World War II when divisions radically different from World War I came to fruition. Let's go to the first slide please.

Before you understand how we're changing the Army, you've got to have the context of why we're changing the Army. The strategic context shown on this slide portrays how active your Army is today. We've got over 300,000 Soldiers spread across the globe, most importantly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there are other places where we are either engaged or we're doing work for the Combatant Commanders in a peace-time environment in those locations. We are a nation at war. This is a prolonged conflict and that has driven us to make changes to our force and also to re-look the tools that we use, both from an organizational level and at a cultural level within the Army. We've got to be able to adapt. We've got to be agile. We've got to be aware. We have to have flexible organizations and it really is about providing Combatant Commanders versatile land power. So, let's go to the next slide.

What are the challenges we are facing today in the current force? Well, I've already addressed that war is the norm and it is a protracted conflict against adaptive adversaries. They know our strengths and they try to dodge them, if you will, try not to meet them head-on. Also, we have to prepare ourselves for people who can find niche capabilities where they can try to meet us on par, either in a small place and time or with a given technology. In the midst of all of this, you still have to have a conventional force that can wage the major combat operations, so this very much is a challenge of full-spectrum operations - everything from humanitarian relief to major combat operations. Our homeland is part of the battle space and that is something we have to look at both in how we use our reserve forces and how we use our active duty forces, and what that really means to us as a nation. We are changing now to meet those challenges. Let's go to the next slide.

So, if you look at the Army we have today, it is very much a mixed force, kind of a hybrid force. Now, most people are familiar with divisions or battalions or brigades, but they really don't know the detail by which these units are distinct. As a matter of fact, our divisions really aren't the same. They may have the same title of Infantry Division or Armor Division but, in fact, through incremental change and marginal shifts in resourcings over the years, they're very much different. Now, when you think about that, how radical is that? Some of our infantry squads don't have the same number of Soldiers in them, some of our units don't have the same number of TOW (tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided) missiles so, as you look at that, you're faced as a planner with these how do you use these organizations that have a lot of similarities but they aren't standardized and they aren't the same? Also, on the left-hand side, at the bottom of this chart, we have specific functional units. As we look at this modular reorganization of our forces, there will still be functional units built for a specific singular type function. There is a chemical brigade, as an example, on the left-hand side. So, we aren't saying that we will eliminate all those kinds of units, but, to our greatest extent possible and feasible, we are going to standardize our force. Let's go to the next slide.

So, when you look at the current force, it's really built around the division. The Army division is a magnificent organization. They are optimized for land campaigns against a like kind of enemy (conventional forces) but, in fact, that is really an old cold war methodology for organizational design. So, we've got to think about taking those large organizations and how can you use them and take them apart and apply them in a task-organized way. As a matter of fact, our mantra was Task Organized. You make the organization more pure and then you break it apart every time you go to use it. If you think about that, that's like a pick-up team for the Super Bowl. Even though we do great work in habitual relationships and training and those sorts of things, and we've become masters of task organization, but can we bring that pendulum back and really work towards organizing the way we fight or more closely organizing the resource in the way we fight. As you look at today's organizations around divisions, they are very much limited in their joint capabilities at the organizational design level. Yes, we've added the ability to talk to joint forces and work in an interoperable environment, but those were additive and that wasn't really a design criteria when they were first developed. So, we're good and we've got to get better to provide Combatant Commanders the ability to mix and match capabilities in a quicker pace or in a more creative fashion. Let's go to the next slide then.

So, how are we going to change? We've got to create units that are more relevant for Combatant Commanders because they have to be agile, they have to be adaptive, and they have to be versatile. So, as you build an organization, make it more self-contained. If you think of the Armored Cavalry Regiment, it was the exception, not the rule, but it was a standing combined arms organization; yet our maneuver brigades, within our divisions, were brigades that then had to be brought together with other elements from support and fires and they created a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). So, we looked at the goodness behind the Armored Cavalry Regiment, we went all the way back to the regimental combat teams of World War II, which were again the exception, and said what is it that we can work. As a matter of fact, if you think about the Army's intellectual underpinnings after Desert Storm, we started on a very in-depth review of what kind of force do we need for land power? The Louisiana Maneuvers, the Army After Next, the work on the Objective Force, the work with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), all of that experimentation, analysis, and studies have underpinned this work that you see now in the modular force and as we organize these more self-contained units, they have to be as capable as the organizations they replaced because no individual Soldier will be placed at greater risk. So, that really was a very clear metric on combat effectiveness, but in a full-spectrum force combat effectiveness, you've got to look at things like maneuver and fires, intelligence, leadership, and protection. So, a lot of what we're seeing today isn't just organizational design, it is a cultural shift within the Army to a brigade-oriented force for adaptive leaders and you see that on the battlefields most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq and we just have to posture ourselves better for the Combatant Commanders use in the future, and as we were working through it, we sought to build a truly joint interdependent force. What does that mean? Well, it's the purposeful reliance on another service to provide a capability. You know they're going to be there. So, a clear example would be the use of joint fires for shaping fires so, does that mean we can reduce some of our artillery, field artillery in the Army? And the answer is yes and we've taken prudent risks. It doesn't mean we're giving away all of our cannons and rockets, but it

does mean can we seek a better balance, because it's about the nations power for the joint force. It is the land power and joint operations and fundamentally, this all centers around adaptive, competent, and confident Soldiers and leaders. So, as we move forward in this, you see leader development as one of the key items for us in the modular force. We will use this to attain all that we seek in the campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. Let's go to the next slide.

People have called this the Rubik's cube. Some people have misinterpreted this chart. On the left you see an example of an armored division of the past. We aren't saying the brigade replaces a division by itself, but what we are saying is that the division was the rule for combined arms organizations. Now we are shifting to the Brigade Combat Team, and on the right-hand side at the top you see a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT). That's now the rule. A Brigade Combat Team will have organic combined arms. When I say organic, what I'm referring to is they belong to that organization, they're always there. It's not a temporary-in-nature type of organization. So, when you look inside that Brigade Combat Team, you see things like combined arms and, in this case, tanks, Bradleys, but you also see armed reconnaissance, engineer, intelligence, fires, logistics, military police, chemical reconnaissance, signal, because those are the capabilities that are usually needed in any operation. So, if it's normally there, why not make it organic? At the same time, there is a notable exception, and that is aviation, because we do live in a resource-constrained environment and the nation cannot afford to place aviation at every single Brigade Combat Team. So, we used a different approach there and you look at the brigades below that, the support brigades and you see aviation is on the left-hand side. In this case, it's a multi-functional aviation brigade. It combines reconnaissance, strike, lift, med-evac, and so, if you can't spread those aircraft across the whole force, then lets bundle them into organizations that can be both a force provider and an executor. So, when you need lift, you turn to the aviation brigade and say "I need the 12 hour lift package" or a "lift package for a battalion". At the same time, we know we have to continue campaigning / sustained land combat. So, who covers the space between maneuver brigades? That's where those other support brigades come in addition to aviation, that's fire, sustainment, the battlefield surveillance brigade, and the maneuver enhancement brigade. For most people, fires resonates with them and it's quite similar to a field artillery brigade of the past, but, in fact, that's really selling it short because they've added, in the staff element, the use of planning for non-lethal effects, information operations. It goes beyond kinetic energy and planning. So, there's a difference there in that fires brigade. You look in sustainment, well we have sustainment today. They're in division support commands, corps support commands, area support groups, theater support groups. It's quite robust and it's very layered. Well we want to reduce the number of layers but not reduce the number of doers or executors. So, you'll see that there's not a reduction in battalions. As a matter of fact, the combat service support elements of the Army underwent modular reorganization starting in the mid-90's. It was inside the division that we didn't take that work and today our work is within what was the division of the past. So, as you look at those sustainment forces at the battalion level and below, you don't see a lot of changes. It's in that integrating headquarters and how many layers of headquarters do you need? At the same time, for every one of these support brigades, expect them to work for someone other than an Army headquarters because that's the nature of joint operations. A fires brigade may go with a marine expeditionary force, so they need to have the connectivity, they need to have

the communications architecture, they need to have the liaison built into their staff to be able to go directly out in war for another organization or directly to a joint task force that may or may not be an Army-led joint task force. Battlefield Surveillance, and to some people it was at one point called the Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) brigade, so I understand that that name change is confusing to some, but we didn't want it to be confused with a lower subordinate unit inside the Brigade Combat Teams called the RSTA battalion, so we've renamed it Battlefield Surveillance because that is the functions around which it's designed. So, it has a heavy influence in military intelligence but it also has the capability to employ things like aviation for reconnaissance; ground reconnaissance, like long-range surveillance; and, a maneuver force if that was what was needed. So, we will task organize, but it won't be the norm, it will be a much reduced task organization. And finally maneuver enhancement. Maneuver enhancement really is very unique because we haven't had this in the Army before. You have to kind of start with the joint functional concept of protection. It's a very holistic look on what wraps around a maneuver unit to enable it, both in term of protection, like air missile defense, military police, chemical, and, as you think about that protection bubble, if you will, that's about maneuver enhancement and, again, this organization has not existed in the Army before. Now, the battalions underneath it are civil affairs units, military police units, yes, they've existed but this integrated, multi-functional headquarters has not. So, that's were the uniqueness of that particular support brigade comes from. So, let's go to the next chart.

So, if you look at brigades as building blocks, you now have what amounts to a menu for the Combatant Commanders. There are three standard maneuver Brigade Combat Teams: Infantry, Heavy, and Striker Brigade Combat Teams. As a matter of fact, we went to school on the Stryker Brigade Combat Team because that organization was already combined arms, it was already very robust in its reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition, so the lessons learned from its development informed our work on the Future Combat Systems (FCS) equipped Unit of Action of the future. At the same time, we went to the Future Combat Systems Unit of Action work and said how do we take it from the future back to the present with Bradleys, with Abrams' tanks, with L-RAS (long-range advanced scout surveillance system) equipped HMMWVs (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles). When you do that, then there are still things you have to keep in terms of the amount of sustainment and amount of logistics, but the use of reconnaissance, the use of joint fires, joint ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), those things enable a current force as they will in the future when the Future Combat System is equipped on what amounts to a Brigade Combat Team of the future or the FBCT. So, as you look at the three standard models there, infantry, heavy, and Stryker, when I go to the next slide, you'll see a lot of commonality. Infantry, we did address some of the short-falls that we've seen for many years in terms of mobility, so there are more trucks than there were in say a true light infantry unit like what was found in the old 10th Mountain Division. At the same time, we go to the heavy force and gave them some capabilities that they haven't had, things like sniper teams. Why would you put a sniper team or a sniper section inside of a heavy force? It's because they encounter cities and this ability to transition, to be more full-spectrum, you may be optimized at some point along the spectrum, but you need to be able to conduct operations across that full range of military operations. Now, at the bottom of the chart, you see the five support brigades. Now, there are some new symbols and graphics there, like maneuver enhancement,

it looks like a shield for protection, so that's a new operational term and graphic that some of you who study those sorts of things haven't seen before. Aviation, fires, sustainment, battlefield surveillance, but don't let the small, singular drawing fool you. It's not just saying aviation and attack helicopter, it also is lift. It's also med-evac, but the symbology there is important. This will comprise the bulk of the combat force, but remember there will still be some other specific units. Port opening is a good example. We don't have a lot of those kinds of organizations, they are well designed so we will resource them to the number we need and keep them, but the bulk of the force will be in one of these organizations here, and it really does set up the conditions of success in terms of doctrine, organization, training, and leader development that lead us to a Future Combat System of equipped forces. Alright, let's go to the next one.

A quick comparison of the maneuver Brigade Combat Teams, and I'll go right to left. Support, having organic logistics within your Brigade Combat Team - notice that all three of them have that. Fires, organic cannons, MLRS (multiple launch rocket system). It's when you get to the maneuver battalions that things seem to be a little bit different, because Stryker shows some separate companies. Well, Stryker was really the first model of this modular reorganization. So, we will continue on because of the success of that organization and learn as we go because right now, we have placed things like engineer capabilities within the maneuver battalions of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team or within the brigade troops battalion of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). So, there are some unique distinctions and we're learning from that. When 3rd Infantry Division went to the National Training Center as a prototype with our early models, we learned some things that were very good, but the Soldiers told us no, you've got some things you've missed here, we need to improve them. For example, on the far left, the brigade troops battalion, having a single place where you can receive attachments or you can place your intelligence, your signal, your MP's all under a unified battalion headquarters. The problem was we didn't make it robust enough. They did a good rotation that first time out, but the feedback was that we overstressed a small group of people, so we had to add a little more capability, in terms of both networking and people, into that brigade troops battalion so, it was a good idea, it worked, but it could be better. So, we are learning as we go and as 3rd Infantry Division operates in Iraq, we will get feedback from them. Also, we're already learning lessons from the 101st, 10th Mountain which will move into 4th Infantry Division, so this is a learning process and you should expect the Army to adapt as it's done because we've done this many times in the past, as far as making changes to fit the operations we see now and, in the future. The question is can we do it at the tempo we need to do now? We have to have that culture of innovation to keep moving because our adversaries are adapting and we will adapt, and we may be wrong about the operating environment of the future so you have to have that strategic edge to be able to go in either direction, because that's what the Combatant Commanders really need. Also, I will call attention to reconnaissance in these organizations. You'll note, it's armed reconnaissance because it has both, Bradleys and HMMWVs, or just RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition), but the key here is a very robust reconnaissance because the best sensor is the human, a Soldier on the ground. You can use a lot of national assets and some other joint assets that kind of get you in the ballpark, but when it comes down to putting the crosshairs on the right target, it involves a human decision or human set of eyes and that integrating function there. So, the weakest link in the kill chain in our analysis was not a

lethal platform, it was acquiring the right target. So, thus, you see robust reconnaissance. As a matter of fact, the light Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the past had no organic brigade level reconnaissance. It used the scouts of its battalions and either pulled them up to the brigade or just left them down there at battalion level so now you see an entire battalion for that same Brigade Combat Team. Let's go to the next chart.

We didn't stop though at the brigade level. We also are working on tailorable command and control headquarters above the brigade. What you see here on the left-hand side is the hierarchy or the stack that was our organizational design of the past - brigade, division, corps, and theater army. As we move forward, we needed to have the ability to be joint capable always and, at the same time, try to make each headquarters robust enough that it didn't always have to rely on subordinates. The divisional brigade of the past had to get its fire support element from the division artillery, had to get its engineer planning cell from the engineer brigade. So, in this work we said that if they're there, make them organic and, as you did that, you un-tether both the subordinates from the headquarters and the headquarters from the subordinates. So, now you see two headquarters where there were three. We call them Unit of Employment X and Y. That is going to change. There is going to be a naming convention, but the real reason for using the units of purpose label is to show that these are different, they're not the same. When you say UEx, that's a headquarters. It will have a mix and match set of subordinates. There won't be a standard set of brigades underneath every Unit of Employment X and that really is the way we already fight, so we're going to organize accordingly based on the needs of the nation and the needs of the Combatant Commanders. When you look at these two organizations, they are more robust than the singular thing they replaced, a division headquarters is smaller than a UEx headquarters, but in fact, the UEx headquarters does things that both a division and corps did in the past, and then a UEy does things that were done at the Army level and at corps level. So, they are more robust, they are more self-contained. They even have organic security elements and that's really pretty interesting because now you don't turn to a subordinate and take one of their infantry companies to go guard or to go protect a given headquarters, so those subordinate organizations are more self-contained and don't have to provide as much to a higher headquarters now because the higher headquarters comes with its own capability in terms of sustainment, network, and protection and survivability. I want you to look closely at the alphabet soup there, JTF, JFLCC, CJFLCC, ARFOR. Joint Task Force, Joint Force Land Component Commander, C stands for Coalition Joint Force Land Component Commander, or Army (ARFOR), Forces Commander. We call upon headquarters to do this mission but, at the design level, they weren't built that way and it was additive, it was always kind of an ad hoc put together. But if you look over our last ten years, there have been a significant number of JTF requirements. So, as we built the Units of Employment X and Y, we stated that they have to be 7-24 capable, they have to be capable of doing these joint missions and all they really have to have added is joint manning so, put the equipment in there, put the communications in there, train the staff to be joint capable and, if you do that, then the Marine Corps provides people, you have a land component headquarters. When you get another service, you can be a joint task force. When you add multi-national forces, you can be a coalition force, so that's the key here. The other part is it's not a stacked hierarchy. Your senior tactical war fighter headquarters is the UEx. The UEy is regionally focused so, if you are the UEy focused in the central command, then you will be the one responsible for Army

and Joint support throughout the area of responsibility and not burden the UEx with that particular one because, in the past, whoever was senior was given that mission, be it Army support to other Army units or Army support to other services. So now, we put the support function in the UEy. At the same time, the UEy is enabled with a deployable command post because there are times where you don't want to have to bring a whole UEx, so they too have the ability to go on an operational forward mission; a non-combatant evacuation is a clear example. You could deploy that command post out of the UEy and not have to bring a command post from the UEx. So that really shows you that it's not a hierarchy, but is in fact a support, if you will, above the brigade. Let's go to the next.

So as you consider employing these, especially for your joint planners, on the left-hand side you see what amounts to the units available, the doers, the executors. It also includes special operations, multinational forces, those other kind of functional units, joint assets, and you bundle them together, or pick them together, some people say plug and play, with a headquarters, whichever it needs to be, UEx or UEy, and then the commander. Now we show multiple commanders because there may be times where you need to raise the rank of a commander for a given operation, multinational issues sometimes require it. So we don't want to have to reorganize or use an entirely different headquarters just because we've had to say increase the rank of a commander so that's where we say you can mix and match this, but it's about tailoring forces for the Combatant Commander in terms of land power. Let's go to the next one.

Now we're converting on a very aggressive schedule. What you see here is the reorganization of existing Brigade Combat Teams on both the Active Component (AC) and within the Army National Guard and we're building new Brigade Combat Teams, ten to fifteen. There will be a decision in fiscal year 06 as to whether or not we will add up to fifteen. So that's taking us from where we started on the AC side with 33, we're going to go to 43 or all the way up to 48, and if you look at the full package for the Army, we're going to go up to 77 to 82 Brigade Combat Teams. At the same time, that reorganization of support forces is underway. The work of the U.S. Army Reserve and the construct of the Expeditionary Packages, what kind of functions or what kinds of organizations do we usually send for these operations. They've done a great amount of work, they're working them with G3, and our Total Army Analysis (TAA) to figure out how do we package these so that we can set up a force generation model that allows us to more closely meet the metric of one (deployed) tour out of three years for AC and one (deployed) tour out of six years for the Reserve Component (RC). We've got a long way to go to get there, but if we don't get started and get into a more disciplined approach to that force generation, we're always going to be a bit behind because if you think about this modular force, it really is about relieving stress on the operating force, giving Combatant Commanders a more versatile land power, better use of joint capabilities, and packaging these in a more flexible bundle, if you will, or the ability to plug and play so that we can provide versatile land component power. Before I leave this slide, I want to take note of the bottom part - common organizational designs. I've heard anywhere from eight to twelve different kind of designs for the Brigade Combat Teams in the past, but what we saw was there would be one type in the Reserve Component for a given kind of unit and another in the Active Component, and that's really not going to work because they've got to be interchangeable. Everyone hits the cycle of employment. So now you see

common design so, if in fact you are a Unit of Employment X, it won't really matter if you're in the Reserve Component or the Active Component, you're design is the same. Not every unit is resourced the same because there are resource constraints, but that's true of the Active Component side as well. So, it's not an active or reserve issue, it really is about whoever is deployed, who is about to be deployed, and then the next tier is those training, so that's pretty much the priority by which they will be resourced in terms of the latest equipment. Alright, let's go to the next one.

What's really important here is to note what's not going to change. The American Soldier remains the centerpiece of the Army. It really is enabling Soldiers; it's about Soldiers and leaders. We equip the force, we don't man equipment. So, if that's the case, the Army Modular Force will continue to leverage the goodness of our traditions and heritages, we retain the Soldier as the centerpiece.

Now, I'm ready to field some questions. Who's first?

Sir, what analysis supports force designed decisions?

Alright, the question is on the analytical underpinnings that dealt with the modular reorganization. Let's pull up the Heavy Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action design. The reason I want to show you this example is, we went through our analytical work, we conducted simulations, and we also leveraged earlier analysis in things like FBCB2, which is a command and control apparatus. We also looked at things like the precision fire studies, how much slip out do you need, where can you best gain it, what do you have to add to the force. So, as we went through the war gaming and at the tactical level and at the operational level, things that you see on this chart came to the surface. For example, within the brigade headquarters, in our analysis you could say well what did you learn about civil affairs and PSYOPS because in a simulation, you don't see that, but when you war game, you do see those sorts of things and you work those in from lessons learned in the field. You'll notice the snipers I talked about earlier. Here you see the heavy use of reconnaissance. You see tactical UAV's, a key example of things we learned from analysis is in the use of UAV's. People who were going through these simulations actually were able to leverage sensors in ways that we had not really anticipated, mass sensors so they could then mass effects. So, there is an example of it. Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) analysis center led a large part of this, but in all of our work, it was not strictly trained operations, it was not strictly Army. We had on our task force for this focus area people from the Marine Corps, people from the Navy, the Air Force, Joint Forces Command, Special Operations Command, because it is a Joint Operations Concept and that's where we had to work within that larger group. So, we've leveraged the talents across the joint force. Next question.

Sir, how did lessons learned influence the force development efforts?

Clearly, the work in OIF played heavily in our work, but it wasn't limited to just that. We went back and reviewed Bosnia, Kosovo, worked our way backwards as far as we needed to in terms of Combat Service Support. What worked in sustainment, Force 21, where did we seek too many efficiencies and lose effectiveness. So, as we went down that path, and again this example of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team, clearly snipers in the force, the ability to have target acquisition, in this case radars and UAV's organic to the unit that provides the

lethal platform. Here you have radars which will belong to the artillery battalion so how is that a lesson learned? Any way you can shrink sensor usage or linkages is an example of where we have to take action. The work of Actionable Intelligence focus area, they have been participating in a separate focus area but informed our work, so they went to the National Intelligence Assets and went through it. So, the ability to bring down an image that would have stopped at a higher headquarters, say at corps or division in the past, now goes all the way down to a box in a Brigade Combat Team because that's where action is taken. So, we leverage heavily those lessons learned. Joint Forces Command also had a parallel effort in assessing at the operational level, what were the joint force lessons learned and so, since we worked in parallel and tandem with them, we were able to learn from their work and they from ours as we move forward and because there are tactical units that take actions that have strategic impact and we wanted to make sure that we were in sync and that we both had the same vision as we moved forward. Next question.

Sir, how can the Army undertake such a massive reorganization while we are at war?

Right. It's not an unusual question because most people think it's too risky, it's too much risk here. But, in fact, I believe our Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, may have said it best when he said you can't miss this opportunity, and he's not saying that war is a good thing, what he's saying is the focus that combat brings, the resources that it brings, and the ability to knock down some of the parochial issues of the past is much greater when you're at war. If you think back, when were the major changes, really significant changes of the Army, well, World War II, huge change. Why? Because the operational environment demanded it. This is no different. So, really the question isn't how can we take the chance, it's how could we risk not doing it in a time of war. So, yes, we're balancing the current operations in the fight while we transform, but the nation requires nothing less. Next question.

Yes sir, you talked about the common designs of the UA. Does the modular force mean the commanders would no longer task organize?

The pendulum will swing back. We're masters of task organization, so, we will continue to have that capability but, to the greatest extent practical, we want to organize as we fight because if you organize that way, they you will train that way and resource that way. So, yes, you will still organize and, again, this Brigade Combat Team can take a company from one battalion and place it in another or you can take a Brigade Combat Team and add, say a civil affairs battalion to it if that was what was required, so we will still task organize, but when we worked in our efforts to make this more capable, more self-contained, we looked at things like the brigade staff. If the brigade staff has to be able to receive attachments and issue them out, which they've done in the past, it's very much stressful, so we increase the robust nature and size of the staff so that they can help plug and play, even at the Brigade Combat Team level or the maneuver brigades, and clearly on the support brigades side, you can expect that the headquarters will receive and release those executor battalions I talked about earlier, transportation is a good example, quartermaster, those types of forces. So, yes, we will task organize, we just are trying to bring the pendulum back that every single mission, every single operation won't take an extensive task organization. One way of thinking about it, you will organize for the operation while you're in CONUS and then you will task organize for a mission in the AO. Who's next?

Sir, why are some reorganizing units different from the model?

That's a good question. When you look at the work of the organizational design, it is a model, it is where we want to hit in an objective, and those who understand what a TOE is, a Table of Organization and Equipment, we've always had an objective. But as resource constraints hits you, or time hits you, how fast can you add something to it. You end up falling short of that and that's where the MTOE, or the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment. If you take 3rd Infantry Division, clearly they were moving rapidly, they had to reorganize, they had to build a Brigade Combat Team, and then they had to be ready to go back to Iraq, so yes they are a prototype, and we learned from that and then as we go, each organization and it is either building or reorganizing, will get closer and closer to that objective and if we're truly a learning organization, that bar should continue to rise because we should get better as we go and resources, there will be a lag there as we work it. The key is it must be as effective as the organization it replaces and no individual Soldier can be placed at greater risk. If you meet those two metrics, then the rest of it will take shape as you go forward. So, it really is about resourcing as we go and it's something that the Headquarters Department and the Army Staff has worked very aggressively to do, to get it as close as you could, so that the difference between the model and what they are fielded with is as small as possible. Next question.

Sir, it would appear that some branches are actually going to lose command opportunities; so, what impact will this have on the career paths for officers and non-commissioned officers?

It really is a two-edged sword. There are some branches that actually will have more commands, there are going to be more maneuver Brigade Combat Teams. So you can see in terms of armor and infantry there would be an increase. But then if you look in organizations like signal, engineer, and air defense, they've really been reorganizing at a battalion headquarters level and, in some cases, we've reduced the number of battalion headquarters or eliminated it. So, there will be a difference in career paths from the non-commissioned officer and the officer in some of those branches, but some of those differences aren't as stark as oh I won't command, therefore I can't be promoted. It will actually morph over to where success, the way to move up the chain, will in fact be a key staff position, central selection of staff officers. In the acquisition corps, we already centrally select program managers. Now, they're not commanders because they don't have the uniform code of military justice responsibilities per se, but they are centrally selected, so you can see that happening in things like the network work of the G6 in the UEx. You can see that happening in the engineers and the air defense, so there are significant changes. Each one of the proponents are working their way through that as we go but there will always be room for success. It won't be an either or, have or have not because the adaptive, aware, and agile leader is the one that is going to take us forward and this is true both in the non-commissioned officers and officer core. Next question.

Sir, is someone working on new or updated doctrine for these new units?

The good news, yes. But we have moved so rapidly, if you sit back and think about it, this started in September 2003. 3rd Infantry Division actually took these organizations back into Iraq, so that is about 14 months from concept to combat. Now, luckily we had the intellectual

underpinnings of the last decade to underpin it, but now we have to make up in terms of doctrine, training, leader development, personnel, facilities. So, there is a significant move for the doctrine. We have already hung in the Riemer Digital Library, that is run by the Army Training Support Center, several of what's called FM-I, Field Manual Interim. This is doctrine, about 80-85% right, the last couple of years. We knew the field needed it, so things like the Heavy Brigade Combat Team, the reconnaissance battalion, the sustainment battalion, and there are more coming. We have the fires and effects manual, the aviation manual are coming. You will see more and more hung, there are about five of them already there as of February. You'll see another in March and they'll continue. The Combined Armed Center (CAC) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will lead this effort and will monitor it so that we can get the relevant doctrine out to the units but you've got to remember, not all doctrine has changed because not every organization has changed. What a battalion does at the lowest level, in many cases, hasn't changed. So, you don't have to necessarily rewrite every field manual. So, we're taking them as they come and getting them into the hands of Soldiers where they are and then this use of the Riemer Digital Library will allow the Soldiers to be more interactive and pull just the pieces they need out of a particular field manual and so, this is really the beginnings of a shift in how we work our doctrine. Kind of object-based productivity, if you will. I mean the *Google search engine* works, so we need to turn that into something that the Army or that type of approach. Next question.

Sir, the focus appears to be on the maneuver Brigade Combat Teams. What's the status of the development of the support brigades?

I'll tell you what, go to the slide example of the fires brigade. Yes, the Brigade Combat Team tends to be the one that most people know about. It was the first one we dealt with as we moved forward. But, the support brigade work has been completed and we completed the organizational design work of the Unit of Employment X and Y. On this slide is a fires brigade as an example. Simple mission statement, and I want to draw your attention to what's organic and what's assigned. Remember organic will always be there, that's it, and then as needed, you assign. Now, field artillery brigades have done this in the past but division artilleries did not. They had three cannon battalions in the past so, if you look up here, I've got a headquarters, I've got a signal capability, a sustainment support capability in terms of mechanics or mess, a target acquisition capability for the radars. You'll see one rocket missile, and that could be HIMARS or could be MLRS, organization of battalion that is organic and then something that we have coming up in the TAC (tactical) UAV. That will be organic. Now, how many other shooting battalions or information operations organizations for the non-lethal will be assigned to those brigades will depend on things like the JSCAP, which is where they request a joint regional Combatant Commander requests forces and capabilities. It'll have to deal with forward presence, how many units you have in a given area, things like training and readiness oversight, so that's really the work that the G3 Force Management has always worked for Headquarters DA and will continue. So, you look at that work where we're not really behind on support brigades, it's just that they were in sequence and, the good news is, we've gotten through that work and it's coming out. Now, you've got to remember maneuver enhancement and battlefield surveillance brigades are different. They haven't really existed in the past and so, there will be a lot more work and learning to be done in terms of doctrine, and those organizations and career paths within those organizations. But things like aviation, fires, and sustainment, it's not going to be that much of a radical shift as

we work through it. Now it is different, not the same number, there won't be a one-to-one correlation necessarily to a UEx to these forces or brigades, but that is something that the G3 Force Management folks will deal with in terms of risk management for the nation.

Are there any more questions?

I really appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Army Modular Force today. I know a lot of you will have questions. This is going to be put out for others to review. The key thing to remember is the Army is transforming and changing while at war, we need to do that, we must do that, and while we do that, we're moving and setting ourselves up for success in the future because you must be adaptive and agile both at a mental and physical level and leverage the joint force capabilities across the board, and that's something the Army has done well in the past, but we've just got to get better and we are moving in that direction already. Thank you.